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 THE OTHER THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT: 
FREE AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION THAT WASN’T 
STEPHEN KANTROWITZ*
This essay considers the great legacy of the Civil War, and of 
Abraham Lincoln: the end of chattel slavery as a constitutional 
institution and the principle of colorblind national citizenship.  We are 
accustomed to telling this story in full knowledge of how it turned out by 
1870, with the constitutional transformations achieved.  But I want to 
think instead about a different history, about the very different and 
much less encouraging Constitution that confronted African Americans 
in the years leading up to emancipation.  Under the stewardship of a 
Supreme Court made up of justices appointed by proslavery presidents, 
with enforcement provisions reflecting proslavery demands, that 
Constitution seemed both to deny them citizenship and to hold slavery 
sacrosanct.  And lest we think that the election of a Republican to the 
presidency in 1860 marked a decisive shift, I want to suggest that this 
appears so only in hindsight.  From the perspective of most African-
American activists, the declension of the nation from the principles of 
the Declaration of Independence continued well into the 1860s.  
Lincoln’s words and deeds often seemed to embody, not challenge, that 
declension. 
 
The constitutional situation of African Americans in the late 1850s 
and early 1860s approached the level of existential peril.  The outlines 
are familiar.  The Fugitive Slave Law of 18501 gave real teeth to the 
guarantees of Article IV of the Constitution;2
 
* Professor of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
 soon afterwards, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott in 1857 and, in particular, Chief 
Justice Taney’s dictum that black people had never been (and could not 
be) citizens—for the black man “had no rights which the white man was 
bound to respect”—rewrote the history of black citizenship as 
1. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. 
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, 
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or 
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on 
Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.”). 
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oxymoronic.3  Yet when writing about Lincoln, the Civil War, or 
Reconstruction, we generally move quickly over this part of the story in 
order to highlight the magnitude of the revolution that followed.  After 
a nod to the racialist views of Lincoln and other Republicans, we note, 
correctly enough, that they were considerably less hostile than their 
opponents to the possibility of African Americans’ freedom and 
participation in at least some spheres of American life.  We turn, for 
verification of this premise, to Frederick Douglass’s retrospectively 
declaring Lincoln “emphatically, the black mans President: the first to 
show any respect for Their Rights as men.”4
Here, by contrast, I am interested in another question: how things 
looked to the black activists who felt the storm coming in the 1850s but 
could not know how or where it would leave them.  From the 
perspective of black activists—including but not limited to Frederick 
Douglass—the situation looked rather different at least until the war 
broke out, and, to many, for several years after that.  From that 
perspective, the future of the United States looked quite different, in 
ways that caused even the staunchest friends of the American nation to 
lose heart. 
  We leave the story 
somewhere in the period of triumph in the half-decade after 
Appomattox, as African Americans moved toward what the era 
considered full political citizenship.  Some of us go on to show how 
egregiously those rights were abridged for generations after, but always 
with the knowledge of the post-World War II black-freedom movement 
and the final vindication of those postwar amendments. 
The Fugitive Slave Law and Dred Scott laid the groundwork for the 
great fear of the 1850s, and it set black activists off in at least three 
directions: into Republican politics, emigration, or slave revolt.  That is, 
in addition to political engagement, black activists also considered two 
entirely different avenues of response: flight from the United States or 
treason against it. 
Many, like Douglass, considered all three possibilities—voting, 
fleeing, and fighting.  Douglass famously came to reject the Garrisonian 
abolitionist view that the Constitution was a proslavery instrument, and 
 
3. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406–07 (1857). 
4. Frederick Douglass, Eulogy on Abraham Lincoln (June 1, 1865), digitized on 
Frederick Douglass Papers, Manuscript Division, No. al0177 (Libr. of Cong.), available at 
http://www.myloc.gov/Exhibitions/lincoln/vignettes/lincolnanddouglass/ExhibitObjects/Freder
ickDouglassDescribingLincoln.aspx. 
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the consequent withdrawal from party politics under its terms.5  He 
believed instead, as did most of his comrades across the black North, 
that the Constitution in various ways affirmed both the illegality of 
slavery and the power of the federal government to abolish it by 
legislation.  He became a Liberty man, then a member of the Radical 
Abolitionist party.6  At the same time, he believed that slaves had a right 
of revolution against a government that ignored their natural rights and 
republican citizenship.  Although Douglass was only a peripheral 
member of John Brown’s conspiracy to overthrow slavery in 1859, he 
fled the country one step ahead of an arrest warrant.7  He wrote home to 
deny that he was or could be a “traitor” to the United States: the 
government Douglass was accused of rebelling against was not his own, 
for “[a]llegiance and protection are said to go together, and depend 
upon each other.  When one is withdrawn”—as Dred Scott had 
withdrawn protection from Douglass and his peers—“the other ceases.”8
The rejection of black citizenship appeared to be on the rise at the 
state level as well.  A succession of territorial legislatures, including 
those under Republican governments, voted on constitutions that 
formally excluded black residents.
 
9
For most of the 1850s, black Northern activists kept the faith in one 
crucial way: while insisting on their natural rights, including the right of 
revolution to preserve those rights, most remained friends in principle of 
the idea of the United States.  They vigorously opposed a renewed 
emigration movement, championed by Henry Highland Garnet, Martin 
Delany, and others, which imagined different avenues to citizenship and 
belonging, in Africa, Hayti (as it was then called), or Canada.
  Even more dramatically, as the 
1850s waned, movements to expel or reenslave free blacks gained 
traction in a number of Southern state legislatures. 
10
 
5. See DAVID W. BLIGHT, FREDERICK DOUGLASS’ CIVIL WAR: KEEPING FAITH IN 
JUBILEE 30–35 (1989). 
  Instead, 
black activists such as Newport, Rhode Island’s George Downing 
refigured their moment of trial as something transcendent—as an 
expression, in fact, of the founding principles of the nation.  The United 
6. See id. at 35, 50–51. 
7. BRIAN MCGINTY, JOHN BROWN’S TRIAL 328 (2009). 
8. Frederick Douglass, To My American Readers and Friends, 2 DOUGLASS’ MONTHLY 
(Rochester, N.Y.) 162 (1859). 
9. See RICHARD H. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1837–1860, at 97–98, 173–74, 323 (1976). 
10. See MARTIN R. DELANY: A DOCUMENTARY READER 1–22 (Robert S. Levine ed., 
2003); STERLING STUCKEY, SLAVE CULTURE: NATIONALIST THEORY AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF BLACK AMERICA 138–92 (1987). 
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States, Downing said in 1859, was divinely destined to “work out in 
perfection the realization of a great principle, the fraternal unity of 
man.”11 African Americans were essential to that process, for their 
presence, as oppressed slaves or nominally free, forced the question of 
how deeply Americans were committed to their founding ideals.  As the 
country at last reckoned with that great contradiction, “[a]ll of the great 
principles of the land are brought out and discussed in connection with 
the Negro.”12  Downing therefore urged his compatriots not to consider 
emigration, for if they departed, “[t]he great ethical school of the times, 
would be closed for the want of a subject.”13  In the war over the 
meaning of American liberty, equality, and republicanism, he explained, 
“We are the alphabet; upon us, all are constructed.”14
But the events of the secession winter, and in particular the 
congressional moves to appease Southern slaveholders, challenged even 
this provisional, processual patriotism. After Lincoln’s election, the 
outgoing president, James Buchanan, told Congress that unless 
Northern states repealed their Personal Liberty Laws, Southern states 
“would be justified in revolutionary resistance to the Government of the 
Union.”
 
15  Meanwhile, numerous compromise proposals circulated 
through Congress.  Two of them bear close attention.  The Crittenden 
Compromise imagined the permanent reestablishment of the Missouri 
Compromise line, with slavery inviolable below that line.16  But despite 
the continuing drama surrounding its proposals, it was not the 
Crittenden proposals that passed Congress.  Instead, a proposed 
Thirteenth Amendment, the Corwin Amendment, would have 
prohibited any amendment to the Constitution giving Congress the 
power to interfere with or abolish slavery where it was currently lawful.17  
On the eve of Lincoln’s inauguration, the Corwin Amendment passed 
both houses of Congress by the requisite two-thirds majority and was 
sent on to the states for ratification.18
 
11. George T. Downing, President, New England Colored Citizens Convention, Address 
Before the New England Colored Citizens Convention (Aug. 1, 1859), in 29 LIBERATOR 
(Boston) 132 (1859). 
  Maryland and Ohio even ratified 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id.  
15. THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE 
NORTH 1780–1861, at 202 (1974) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 2 
(1861)). 
16. See The Crittenden Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1861, at 4. 
17. See 12 Stat. 251. 
18. See id.; CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1285, 1403 (1861) (reflecting votes). 
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it in conventions.19  In his inaugural address, the new president referred 
to the Corwin Amendment as nothing new or objectionable, merely an 
explicit statement of what he called “implied constitutional law.”20
As bad as this was for proponents of an antislavery Constitution, it 
could have been worse, and very nearly was.  The Corwin Amendment 
was offered in part because the Crittenden proposals displeased 
proslavery Democrats, who rejected any limit on the spread of slavery.  
To make the Crittenden proposals more palatable to this constituency 
and bring them forward as a constitutional settlement of the slavery 
question, Stephen Douglas crafted stringently and explicitly anti-black 
supplementary articles which were introduced in both houses.
 
21  The 
first of these struck fear in the hearts of men such as Frederick Douglass 
and George Downing.  It declared: “The elective franchise and the right 
to hold office, whether federal, State, territorial, or municipal, shall not 
be exercised by persons who are, in whole or in part, of the African 
race.”22
The United States shall have power to acquire from time 
to time districts of country in Africa and South America, 
for the colonization, at expense of the federal treasury, of 
such free negroes and mulattoes as the several States 
may wish to have removed from their limits, and from 
the District of Columbia, and such other places as may 
be under the jurisdiction of Congress.
  This rendered explicit that the United States was to be a white 
man’s polity, dashing the hopes of most free blacks and doing a positive 
constitutional injury to those in Massachusetts and elsewhere who voted 
and even aspired to political office.  The second of the Illinois senator’s 
articles was even more ominous: 
23
Consider again the specifics: colonization “of such free negroes and 
mulattoes as the several States may wish to have removed.”  Colonization 
here dropped its paternalist mask of gradualist civilizationism and made 
its true desire explicit: the involuntary deportation of free African 
Americans.  When presented in the House as a substitute measure for 
the Corwin Amendment, the Crittenden Compromise plus these 
 
 
19. 1862 Md. Laws 22; 1861 Ohio Laws 190. 
20. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 270 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953). 
21. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1861). 
22. 36 J. OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S., 1860–61, at 217–18 (1860) 
[hereinafter HOUSE JOURNAL]. 
23. Id. 
1372 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:1367 
proposals failed, but only by a margin of 80–113—and this after many 
slave-state representatives had already resigned to join the 
Confederacy.24
For people who imagined themselves as political citizens of a 
perfected United States, these were existential threats.  And they raised 
the question anew for African Americans: was the United States a good 
idea?  By the early months of 1861, fewer and fewer were able to answer 
the question decisively in the affirmative.  Black Northerners began to 
lose heart.  George Downing no longer sounded the defiantly optimistic 
tones of 1859, when he proudly identified black Americans with the 
nation’s divine project.  Now, in An Appeal to the White Citizens of the 
State, he pleaded with his countrymen not to abandon that common 
destiny:  “Drive us not to an inhospitable land, either soon to die of 
fever or deteriorate in intellect, under the influence of a superstitious 
religion.”
 
25  But he spoke now from fear and despair more than 
conviction.  Downing’s editor presented him as having “no doubt that 
the North would sacrifice the whole race of colored people to save the 
Union.”26
No wonder, then, that as the spring began, even the most strident of 
the anti-emigrationists despaired.  If the North were indeed ready to 
“sacrifice the whole race of colored people,” then, Frederick Douglass 
concluded, it might be time to consider other alternatives.  Douglass’s 
rhetoric took a new turn.  “If we go any where, let us go to Hayti,” he 
wrote in January 1861, and that conditional “if” quickly moved toward 
personal interest.
 
27
During the last few years the minds of the free colored 
people in all the States have been deeply exercised in 
relation to what may be their future in the United 
States. . . .  At the North there are, alas! too many proofs 
  Within a few months, Douglass announced on the 
front page of his newspaper that he was about to depart for a tour of the 
black republic, in part to investigate the island as a possible home.  He 
acknowledged what many of his readers across the North were thinking: 
 
24. See R. Alton Lee, The Corwin Amendment in the Secession Crisis, 70 OHIO HIST. Q. 
1 (1961); HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 22, at 407–13 (recording the House’s Feb. 27, 1861 
vote on the Crittenden proposals); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1260–61 (1861) 
(same). 
25. George T. Downing, An Appeal to the White Citizens of the State, in Protest of 
Colored Citizens, 31 LIBERATOR (Boston) 31 (1861). 
26. Id. 
27. Frederick Douglass, Emigration to Hayti, 3 DOUGLASS’ MONTHLY (Rochester, 
N.Y.) 386 (1861). 
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that the margin of life and liberty is becoming more 
narrow every year. . . .  The apprehension is general, that 
proscription, persecution and hardships are to wax more 
and more rigorous and more grievous with every year; 
and for this reason they are now, as never before, looking 
out into the world for a place of retreat, an asylum from 
the apprehended storm which is about to beat pitilessly 
upon them.28
Pleas, remonstrances, elections, and revolts—all had failed to turn the 
hearts of white Americans.  Perhaps, finally, the time had come to look 
elsewhere. 
 
While the outbreak of war changed Douglass’s calculation, it did not 
immediately change prevailing Union views of black citizenship.  
President Lincoln, as we have seen, argued that the Constitution under 
which he was going to war countenanced the inviolability of slavery 
where it existed.29  General Benjamin Butler arrived in Maryland, 
promising to defend the state’s citizens in the event of a possible slave 
revolt, as implied by the Constitution.30  And Abraham Lincoln greeted 
a delegation of black leaders in 1862 with urgings to lead their people 
out of the country:  “Go where you are treated the best, and the ban is 
still upon you.”31  Of this fact he said, “I cannot alter it if I would.”32
We know the end of this story: how slaves and free blacks forced 
themselves upon an unwilling Union, made themselves essential to 
military victory, and created the legacy of military service that prompted 
Lincoln, then Congress, then the states to imagine them as free, as 
citizens, and even as voters.  In concluding our account of the Civil War 
era with that story, we have naturalized the arc of events into an 
inevitable triumph of right over wrong, one that, in constitutional terms, 
would survive the end of Reconstruction and the imposition of Jim 
Crow.  Yet, in losing sight of how close the nation came to a 
constitutional order guaranteeing the survival of slavery, we lose sight of 
how tenuous the nation’s claim on African-American patriotism had 
become, and of how hard it was for black activists to reconcile 
 
 
28. Frederick Douglass, A Trip to Hayti, 3 DOUGLASS’ MONTHLY (Rochester, N.Y.) 
449–50 (1861). 
29. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
30. HOWARD P. NASH, STORMY PETREL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF GENERAL 
BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, 1818–1893, at 89 (1969); cf. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
31. Refuge of Oppression: The President on African Colonization, 32 LIBERATOR 
(Boston) 133 (1862). 
32. Id. 
1374 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:1367 
themselves to the Union.  Frederick Douglass now stands in as the 
representative African-American founder of the nation and the moral 
counterweight to Lincoln’s political genius, but it is all too easy to forget 
how close even he came to rethinking his allegiances, let alone how 
many of his compatriots wavered or even departed in the last bitter 
years before emancipation and Reconstruction.  Free African 
Americans’ dogged, persistent hope that the United States was, for 
them, a good idea, turned out to be essential: essential to Union victory, 
to the establishment of nonracial citizenship, to the remaking of the 
Constitution.  We forget at our peril that that very hope was, across all 
of our national history, perhaps the single greatest collective leap of 
faith. 
 
